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ABSTRACT
This paper explains the reason why the hitherto statist country,
Korea, has carried out signiﬁcant decentralization since the 2000s.
In explaining the motivation for decentralization, extant literature
has focused on the role of parties, bureaucratic politics,
democratization, or territorial interests. Yet there is still limited
explanation of how the decentralization laws in Korea could be
successfully passed in the 2000s, while cental stakeholders still
persisted. By tracing the process of decentralization reform in the
2000s, this article demonstrates how structural factors created
favourable circumstances and discursive background for
institutional change, and how the idea of decentralization,
through the idea diffusion mechanism, gave directions for central
decision makers to produce a speciﬁc path of reform strategies. It
also pays attention to the formation of ‘practical authority’ for
reform politicians that made it possible to overcome obdurate
resistance from central bureaucrats and politicians.
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Introduction
Increased subnational authority is now in vogue and decentralization has become an
essential feature of the process of political transformation from the past generation
(Faguet, 2014; Marks et al., 2008). From the 1970s onward some profound transformation
in central–local government relations was witnessed in western democracies such as
France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, and the changes include territorial reorgan-
ization, functional rearrangement and redistribution of ﬁnancial resources across different
levels of government. Even countries that already enjoyed substantial level of local auton-
omy, like the United States, boosted empowerment of subnational organs of government
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). According to the World Bank, about 95 percent of
democratic countries are implementing some sort of decentralization reform, regardless
of size, degree of democracy and the scale of the economy (Rodriguez-Pose and
Ezcurra, 2010: 620–621).
South Korea has often been known as a typically strong and highly centralized state
where the markets and local governments were tightly controlled by the central state
during the period of rapid industrialization. However, political turmoil and the economic
crisis in the 1990s was followed by remapping of the previously dominant centralized
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model—i.e. developmental authoritarianism—which had delivered tangible economic
success in a very short span of time. Although the notion of a strong state and a develop-
mental regime is still lingering, it is also true that the central government has begun to lose
its power precipitously since the late 1990s. Amidst the dual shock of domestic political–
economic change and the globalizing economy, many centralized countries, including
Korea, have pursued far-reaching decentralization reform as a cure-all strategy for
meeting economic, political, social and international challenges, since it was also com-
monly believed that decentralization would promote socio-economic development, efﬁ-
ciency, transparency and democracy (Faguet, 2014; Grindle, 2007; Roddan, 2004;
Treisman, 2007).
The attempts to transform the centralized structure in Korea are not a new phenom-
enon in its post-war history. Yet, despite a series of reforms, the gradual devolution and
transfer of functions to local governments has slowed greatly, because of inadequate devo-
lution of appropriate ﬁnancial resources and decision-making authority; changes in
relations between central and local governments have at best been piecemeal throughout
the post-war period (Lee, 1996). While the ﬁrst constitution (1948) had mandated local
autonomy, the military regime (1961–1987) forcefully abolished it and introduced the
‘command and control system’ of intergovernmental relations. After the national demo-
cratization (1987), there was substantial progress toward decentralized governance and
direct local elections were allowed by the revised Local Autonomy Act. Yet the magnitude
of reforms in central–local relations in the earlier period of new democracy was not as
great as people might have expected. Thus, in the historical context of the Korean govern-
ment’s decentralization, the emergence of advocates of decentralization among national
politicians and bureaucrats who were often considered major opponents of the reform
in the 2000s was a striking phenomenon. The establishment of specialized committees
for decentralization (2003), recruitment of decentralists to governments and the passage
of laws promoting decentralization (2003–2008), strengthening the basis of self-governing
through residential recall (2007), petitioning (2000), educational autonomy (2009) and
participatory budgeting (2004) as well as the transfer of central affairs under the Kim
Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations seem to be more than mere marginal
adjustments in central–local relations.
Korea’s decision to carry out deeper decentralization, beyond simple local elections, in
the late 1990s and early 2000s posits three interesting and interrelated questions. First, why
did Korea, despite a lack of historical experience in local democratic governance and the
relatively successful ‘top-down system’, suddenly decide to decentralize in the 1990s–
2000s? Second and relatedly, under what conditions did decision makers choose decentra-
lization reform as a formal policy agenda and how has it been successfully implemented?
Lastly, why has consolidation of the new local democracy been limited over time since the
initial legislation? The ﬁrst question relates to the timing and structural conditions that
made the passage of decentralization reform bills possible in Korea’s context. The
second and third questions imply the need to inquire why Korea could not make a ‘big
bang’ reform in central–local relations after the initial legislation in 2003.
As discussed in the following section, the existing literature on the development of decen-
tralization has mainly focused on democratization (Diamond, 1999; Turner, 1999), globali-
zation (Rondinelli et al., 1998), party/interest politics (Falleti, 2010; Riedl and Dickovick,
2013) or inter-scalar tension (B. Park, 2008; Sonn, 2010) as the main causes of
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decentralization. Yet these explanations do not provide clear answers to the questions the
decision makers choose to address, the speciﬁc content of reform proposals and determi-
nation of the top priorities in the reform process. In this context, this research sheds light
on an array of phenomena, from a decision-making perspective, by drawing attention to
‘ideational’ elements and the exercise of ‘practical authority’ that possibly link the structural
(institutions) and the individual (interests) factors together. I argue that in the Korean
context, decentralization as a policy idea gave visible direction to central decision makers,
helped to formulate a speciﬁc path of strategies and framed the discursive background of
the reform in the light of the overwhelming national political and economic uncertainty
of the late 1990s. Assuming that the degree and content of decentralization reforms are
highly dependent upon the pattern of domestic political–economic change as well as inter-
action with structural factors, this paper also emphasizes how practical authority, which is
deﬁned as ‘power-in-practice’, was formulated and recognized by key decision makers as
effecting substantial institutional changes based on the new policy ideas against obdurate
resistance and bringing about comprehensive decentralization.
The remainder of this paper illustrates the foregoing remarks by reviewing extant lit-
erature on the evolution of decentralizaiton and local democracy and traces the process
of the politics of decentralization reform in the past decade with an emphasis on ideational
factors. I look for evidence in government documents, discourses in secondary resources,
and elite interviews with past decision makers in the government.
Politics of decentralization: an analytical framework
Diverse approaches have been adopted to address social issues and problems such as
inequality, development and representation, but perhaps no issue has received as much
attention as decentralization (Treisman, 2007). As the cases of countries undergoing the
transformation of central–local government relations show, ‘decentralization’ has been
one of the most frequently and widely used terms in the context of changing intergovern-
mental and state–society relations across continents.
There is a broader and more multifaceted social meaning that has agglomerated with
the passage of time. The most common deﬁnition of decentralization includes administra-
tive, political and ﬁscal decentralization (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007; Falleti, 2010; Jun
and Wright, 1996; Roddan, 2004). First, administrative reform refers to general transfer of
the responsibility for providing public services and administrative functions such as edu-
cation, social services, public safety, utilities and health from central government to sub-
national bodies; the process of administrative reform usually—but not necessarily—entails
devolution of decisional authority and de-concentration. Second, political decentralization
implies new constitutional or legal design for subnational political actors that include
directly elected mayors, governors and local councillors (Jun and Wright, 1996). Third,
ﬁscal decentralization is designed to increase ﬁscal autonomy of subnational governments
by delegating decisional authority on matters of taxation or local expenditure (Treisman,
2007). Other scholars have extended these three types of decentralization by drawing on
several standards such as territory and function. For Turner (1999: 4–5), ‘territorial decen-
tralization’ includes devolution, de-concentration and privatization, while ‘functional
decentralization’ reﬂects transfer of authority to functionally specialized agencies like
interest groups, quasi-nongovernmental organizations (quangos), or private actors.
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The abovementioned deﬁnitions of decentralization indicate that there is no formulaic
pattern of it across time and space. The bottom line is that different countries are carrying
out various kinds of decentralization from the most basic level to the very complicated
one. Since the late 1980s, after the Cold War era came to an end and most authoritarian
regimes fell, centralized states in Latin America, East Asia and Central Europe have accel-
erated the process of promoting international trade and investment and this has cast light
on the local as well as national climate for smooth provision of services, infrastructure,
quality of life and so on. Such local conditions usually require strong subnational govern-
ments and civic organizations (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007: 5). At the same time, the
‘new public management’ movement, which was initiated in the UK and New Zealand
and spread to other countries, also encourages decentralization along with other innova-
tive government reforms (Kamark, 2000).
As such, for various reasons, many countries have opted for decentralization but the
actual motivation (cause) and consequences of it can vary across regions in reality. Inter-
estingly, little attention has been paid to the causes of the variations in central–local gov-
ernment relations. It was not until the 1990s that the East Asian countries such as Japan
and Korea went through unprecedented transformation of central–local government
relations. Under the Kim Dae Jung administration (1998–2003), the Korean government
made efforts to modernize the ﬂawed post-war central–local government relationships by
enacting the Law for the Promotion of the Transfer of Central Authorities in January 1999
and established specialized reform committees dealing with decentralization agenda. As
Table 1 shows, the Roh administration (2003–2008) established the Presidential Commit-
tee on Government Innovation and Decentralization (PCGID), a pilot organization set up
to pursue decentralization more effectively. In collaboration with central ministries, the
PCGID developed the blueprint for comprehensive decentralization (the Decentralization
Roadmap) that aimed at both decentralized and de-concentrated governance (July 2003).
Finally, in December of 2003, as a result of these efforts, the Special Law on Decentraliza-
tion Promotion (SLDP), containing three chapters and 21 articles, on new central–local
relations was passed in the National Assembly. The PCGID and related ministries pre-
pared a comprehensive list of central affairs to be decentralized and designed new insti-
tutions for that purpose. Following this special law, subsequent reform measures such
as the resident recall system (2006) and Jeju Special Self-governing Province (July 2006)
were introduced.
Before the passage of these bills there had been some attempts, endorsed by opposition
parties, to reorganize the central government but they were not successful. The authoritar-
ian regime (1961–1987) had suspended the practice of local democracy for 30 years for
various reasons such as administrative inexperience of subnational governments, insufﬁ-
cient ﬁscal resources and the North Korean threat (Bae and Kim, 2013: 264). The reintro-
duction of local elections in 1991 and 1995 heralded the ﬁrst full-ﬂedged local democracy
under the non-military regime in post-war history and undeniably laid the groundwork
for further decentralization in the 2000s by building basic local democratic institutions.
Yet the ruling party, the conservative political parties and the former President Roh Tae
Woo (1988–1993), worried about the shrinkage of their power base at the centre, deferred
the local elections three times and were reluctant to transfer full authority to local execu-
tives (Yoo, 1994: 516).1 Above all, central bureaucrats and politicians of the ruling party—
mostly the older generation of politicians from the authoritarian regime—were disinclined
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to share power. Even under the two civilian administrations, politicians in the National
Assembly, where the conservative Grand Nationl Party (149 of 272 seats) was dominant,
and bureaucrats in central ministries were not cooperative over the passage of decentra-
lization bills (Kim et al., 2004: 27–53).2 Then what explains the success of the abovemen-
tioned legislation in the late 1990s and the early 2000s?
Recent studies have provided some plausible theories explaining the global shift toward
decentralized states, outlining the reasons why national policy makers have endorsed
decentralization, pointing out the role played by political parties, electoral strategies,
bureaucratic politics and the democratization process as the main causes of decentraliza-
tion. First, functionalist explanations emphasize the importance of socio-economic devel-
opment as well as democratic governance at the local level in the promotion of
decentralization. In other words, by highlighting the erosion of the power of central auth-
orities, these perspectives argue that the level of decentralization is dependent upon the
growth of localities in size, population, scale of the economy, urbanization rates, local
expenditures, democratization and so forth (Diamond, 1999; Sharpe, 1988). The second
approach is linked to the logic of bargaining games played between central and local
Table 1. Points of decentralization reform in Korea.
Period
Major legislation/policy
on decentralization Programmes
Types of decentralization
(emphasis)
Kim Young-Sam
Administration
(1993–1998)
Revision of Local
Government Act (1994)
. Direct election of local political actors
(governors, mayors, councillors)
Political decentralization
(democracy)
Kim Dae-Jung
Administration
(1998–2003)
Law for Promotion of
Transfer of Central
Authorities (1999)
. Establishment of Presidential
Committee for the Promotion of
Transfer of Central Authorities (1999)
. Planning the promotion of devolution
. Investigate transferable affairs
. Monitoring devolution process
Administrative and ﬁscal
decentralization
(devolution)
Roh Moo-Hyun
Administration
(2003–2008)
Special Law on
Decentralization
Promotion (2004)
. Establishment of Presidential
Committee on Government Innovation
and Decentralization (2003)
. Designing decentralization roadmap
(2003)
. Initiate decentralization reform:
delegation of central authorities/
discussing possible devolution of public
education and public safety/
rationalization of national and local
taxation system/enhancement of local
council
Full-ﬂedged
decentralization (self-
governing/balanced
development)
Special Law on the
Establishment of Jeju
Speical Province (2006)
. Abolishment of traditional command-
and-control system for Jeju Island for
the promotion of internationalization
and economic development
Regional economy
Other measures . Resident petitioning (2004)
. Group litigation (2006)
. Resident recall system (2007)
. Sepcial administrative city (2006)
. Partial educational autonomy (2009)
Follow-up
decentralization
Source: Bae and Kim (2013); MOGAHA (2005).
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politicians who have different territorial interests. For example, if subnational interests
prevail in the process of territorial reorganization, political and ﬁscal decentralization is
likely to occur ﬁrst, instead of administrative delegation alone, which may in reality add
to the problems of local governments (Falleti, 2010). The third explanation recognizes
decentralization as a product of pork-barrel, electoral, or party politics, arguing that
central political actors mobilize localities in order to hold on to power in national politics
(Garman et al., 2001). Building upon this, Riedl and Dickovick (2013) additionally inves-
tigated the impact of the relative power of ruling and opposition parties in shaping the
content of the decentralization reform.
While the abovementioned theories explored the cases of developing countries such as
Latin America to explain the origin of decentralization reform and offer plausible insights,
the reason why even successful statist countries in other regions like Northeast Asia are
pursuing decentralized forms of governance despite facing politically and economically
hard times still needs further clariﬁcation. Despite their usefulness, all explanations claim-
ing modernization factors, pork-barrelling, or bargaining processes as motives behind
countries’ drive to endorse decentralization programmes only offer partial explanations
of why the Korean decentralization took place in the late 1990–2000s, but not earlier.
For instance, according to the functionalistic perspective, one might expect that even if
Korea lagged behind other advanced countries in terms of the degree of decentralization,
it would be expected to have caught up and become a leading country by now. However,
despite the socio-economic development and the level of democracy in Korea, decentra-
lization did not materialize during periods of economic prosperity. B. Park (2008) argued
that top-down regulation from the centrist state had generated ‘inter-scalar tension’
between the national and the local governments during the period of authoritarian devel-
opmentalism. However, only after initial decentralization reform in the early and mid-
1990s, which was conditioned by the democratization movement in 1987, various empow-
ered, place-dependent forces could demand further transfer of power to localities. As such,
while not denying the growing power of local governments in the earlier decentralization
process in the 1990s, the reason why central stakeholders agreed to devolve central affairs
to subnational bodies is not fully addressed in the extant literature. It is also true that most
political parties are attached to speciﬁc territorial interests, i.e. their electoral bases (Kwon,
2004), yet—regardless of party afﬁliation and territorial interests—they were unwilling to
implement substantial decentralization and systematically ignored the requests from the
localities, because it implied sharing their dominant political status with local executives
in their respective electoral districts (Kim, 2008: 20). Politicians in opposition parties
were relatively more favourable towards promoting local democray but failed to seize pol-
itical power for decades as regional support was substantially weaker than for their con-
servative counterparts.
Anaytical framework: idea, practical authority and decentralization
During the national clamour for democratization, major central political actors as well as
advocates of decentralization had taken the stand that any political opposition to decen-
tralization was anti-democratic, regardless of the personal position or preference on
decentralization (Yoo, 2006). There was a strong collective belief that decentralization
was an essential ingredient of the grand democratization. Where is the origin of this
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belief? In the literature, many scholarly works from the perspective of historical institu-
tionalism and constructivism have discussed how decisions on institutional and policy
changes like decentralization are driven by ideas, which is commonly deﬁned as the domi-
nant world view, paradigm, culture, international norms or shared values (Berman, 2001;
Campbell, 2004; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Considering the earlier formation of
central–local governments’ relations in different countries and dependency on borrowed
knowledge and ideas during most of the developmental period, it is not unnatural to
explore the possible infuence of ideas on decentralization reform.
Drawing on the existing political science and public policy literature, a number of scho-
lars have dwelled upon several aspects of ideational inﬂuence on institutional and policy
changes. In particular, since the nature of ideas is ‘relational’ to other factors (Carstensen,
2010; Béland, 2009), they are not merely possible sources of institutional and policy
changes; it is necessary to explicate the causal mechanism that links ideas to political insti-
tutions, structural enviornment and powerful actors in public policy-making processes
(Campbell, 2004; Yee, 1996).
A generally agreed view on the role of ideas in policy changes is that certain structural
environments determine whether an idea will be adopted or not (Florini, 1996; Kingdon,
1995) and the idea itself participates in construction of the content, strategy and priority of
a speciﬁc reform (Béland, 2009). More speciﬁcally, the role of ideas in shaping reforms and
policy changes can be described as follows. First, advantageous conditions such as external
shocks, ﬁnancial crises, political upheavals and changing socio-economic conditions that
require an appropriate level of domestic policies in both public and private sectors facili-
tate deployment of new ideas by decision makers (Checkel, 1997).3 The present crisis pro-
vides a ‘discursive background’ for addressing the need for reforms by highlighting the
problems of central dominance. Given structural problems, ideas allow decision makers
(agents) to reduce the uncertainty by interpreting the nature of crisis (Blyth, 2002: 11).
Although the global economic situation, recession and crisis were never uniformly
strong in Korea and there were many different diagnoses of the origin of the crisis, it is
true that Korea’s ﬁnancial crisis clearly destabilized the foundation of the centralized
system. The crisis exposed the structural ﬂaws in the ﬁnancial and banking systems and
the central government did not have appropriate mechanisms to monitor transparency.
The ﬁnancial institutions and banks were protected by central agencies that provided ‘pol-
itical loans’ to selected conglomerates, which became bad loans during the crisis (Kihl,
2005: 157–158). Accordingly, due to this presence of an inefﬁcient and paralysed
central system, the government gradually lost its legitimacy and was unable to focus on
meeting the demand for further development and issues related to economic difﬁculties
at the subnational level (UCLG, 2009).
Secondly, ideas contain ‘instruction sheets’ or ‘poweful ideational weapons’ for decision
makers and provide plausible and clear ways to overcome a crisis or recession, as shown in
the example of monetarism which was considered a cure for the problem of inﬂation
during times of economic difﬁculties (Walsh, 2000: 485). In the context of Korea, the
regional economic gap, the bubble economy and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) bailouts were instrumental in triggering the move towards neoliberal ideas (para-
digm) in government reform (Kihl, 2005). Among the ideas in a form of programme,
devolution and ‘balanced development’ oriented decentralization has been one of the
most frequently employed measures to remedy the problematic centralized system,
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inefﬁcient economy and imbalanced state–society relations that are typically conspicuous
in economically hard times (Faguet, 2014).
Thirdly, a ‘good’ idea is not always accepted, nor does it always impact on policy for-
mulation, because there is also an interest-based power relationship between the idea and
the policy (Weir, 1989: 84–85). To a large extent, successful adoption of new ideas or pro-
grammes such as neoliberal reform or decentralization depends on whether actors occu-
pying important political positions and ofﬁces determine which ideas are realistically
implementable in the process of reform (Cartensen, 2010: 854; Weir, 1989: 84). In particu-
lar, the reformers may ﬁnd spaces for action that allow successful implementation of a
new reform idea against obdurate resistance from vested interests. Abers and Keck
(2013: 22–23) portrayed this building of capabilities and recognition in the pursuit of
reform as ‘practical authority’. To make this practical authority work, top reformists
gradually accumulate a reputation as problem-solving agents by building intermediary
institutions that are closely connected to politically powerful stakeholders and are likely
to produce the desired changes. In Korea’s decentralization reform in the 2000s, reformist
leaders recruited supporters (idea brokers) and placed them in important postitions such
as top executive positions in special reform councils, administrative agencies or ministries.
Although the reform councils in Korea have at best been nominal throughout the history,
these actors and agencies, backed by top leadership, graudally gained external recognition
as effective problem-solving institutions by designing roadmaps of decentralization and
producing intermediate outcomes.
Finally, support from the societal level is also crucial for continuing pursuit of a selected
idea or reform agenda in policy processes (Campbell, 2004: 96). Even if the idea of reform
is socialized as an effective solution, it might not be successfully implemented without pol-
itical legitimacy. Decision makers discern public opinion or voices at the societal level
through various channels such as public opinion polls, feedback from constituents, hear-
ings or policy suggestions. In the case of decentralization, there was a clear division of
interests between central and local governments and thus local governments and civil
societies, as well as local businesses, attempted to inﬂuence the content of the reform in
Korea (Bae and Kim, 2013).
To summarize, the four components can be analysed as a sequential process (Figure
1). When the existing paradigm or speciﬁc policy cannot effectively resolve the policy
failure and there is great uncertainty, policy makers, in turn, re-examine or reinterpret
their previously taken-for-granted policies and assumptions about the problems and
solutions. In doing so, perceived problems open up the possibility of adopting a new
idea when the policy makers are convinced that programmes inﬂuenced by the idea
would resolve the policy failure and improve undesirable situations. Finally, actors con-
vinced by consultations and evidence adopt the new ideas. It is not too difﬁcult to
imagine that the decentralization idea whose theoretical beneﬁts are well recognized
among key stakeholders would most likely be adopted as an alternative for resolving
problems. Once a new idea is successfully implemented through ‘idea diffusion mech-
anism’, which might produce practical power to inﬂuence relevant stakeholders, the
changed institution gets stabilized and the process is repeated over a period of time
(Yee, 1996).
Considering the relational nature of ideas to structural and individual factors, it is
important to note that an idea has different components that do not occupy equally critical
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positions (Cartensen, 2011). In the Korean context, decentralization has not had a uniform
meaning in the modern period and understanding the changing emphasis on different
‘non-core’ elements of the decentralization idea over time is crucial. Considering the tra-
jectory of Korea’s development and political transformation, the earlier idea of decentra-
lization (t1, time 1) was understood as a core democratic principle (e1, element 1) for
opposition politics under authoritarian rule.4 Yet, with the global wave of neoliberalism
and the 1997 ﬁnancial crisis (t2), advocates of decentralization have started putting
more emphasis on inefﬁciency (e2), balanced development and regional inequality (e3)
over democratic values (Rozman, 2002). The following analysis of Korea’s decentralization
shows how political interests were inﬂuenced and mitigated by the adoption of the new
decentralization idea in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.
Structural factors: decline of the central model and decentralization ideas
Korea has gained a reputation for being a ‘developmental state’ because of its economic
success. Due to the high degree of state intervention and centralized power that preceded
the economic success, a dominant belief has been that the centralized system was in a
better position to promote the national economy through legal, ﬁnancial and informative
support (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990). It has also been argued that the Korean economic
miracle was largely the outcome of the state’s spatial policy and disproportionate distri-
bution of limited resources to selected regions in the process of industrialization
(B. Park, 2008). In doing so, Korea, one of the resource-poor countries in the region,
achieved an unprecedented growth rate and scale of export-oriented development from
the 1960s. Since the structural core of the developmental regime in East Asia was a cen-
tralized system, the success of economic growth and industralization meant rapid centra-
lization of the government (B. Park, 2008).
Regardless of the economic success, however, favourable perceptions of the centralized
state governance have gradually changed since the process of democratization began and
this perception further declined after the economic crisis in 1997. In the era of globaliza-
tion and in the wake of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis in the late 1990s, although there is no
precise turning point, highly centralized decision-making authority and population and
national infrastructure concentrated in Seoul Metropolitan Area (SMA, Sudokwo˘n) –
the most notable by-products of centralization – became the main targets of criticism.
In order to modernize the economy and the industry, the Park Chung Hee regime
Figure 1. An analytical framework: ideational diffusion model.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 71
strategically provided ﬁnancial and administrative incentives to export-oriented compa-
nies and adopted the ‘growth pole’ policy that promoted the growth of selected cities
and regions. Population and businesses have located around the industrial complexes in
SMA or Busan coastal industrial areas because this provided an easy path to central
bureaucrats and ﬁnancial resources (Wade and Kim, 1978). Notwithstanding the inten-
tions of the national leaders, the planned economic development process orchestrated
by the central government produced an exceedingly centralized distribution of population
and resources (Figure 2). SMA, although accounting for only 11 percent of the Korean ter-
ritory, became one of the largest urbanized regions in the world, with a very high concen-
tration of population, big business headquarters, manufacturers and research and
development investment (MOCT, 2002). Even when the economic recovery programmes
were carried out by the Kim Dae-Jung administration, economic resources, foreign funds
and political authorities were much more concentrated at the centre. This was because the
government-initiated recovery programmes aimed at the fastest and most efﬁcient resol-
ution of the crisis (PCNBD, 2004: 37).
The problems of centralization vary. Firstly, concentration of business in the SMA
caused the rapid increase of rent and transaction costs for businesses. In addition, the
degraded environment and lack of amenities and housing signiﬁcantly increased costs
for the government. Due to the widened regional disparity stemming from over-concen-
tration, antagonistic regionalism between the advanced and devastated regions became a
serious socio-economic problem in Korean society. Above all, dominance of the central
government failed to meet local citizens’ demands and deepen democratic practices:
Rozman (2002: 12) called the central government’s promise of decentralization ‘a lip
service’. The central government had taken measures to resolve the problem, from reloca-
tion of central ministries, agencies and public universities to the spatial regulation—i.e.,
greenbelt policy—in the SMA. Yet it failed to address the over-concentration problem
effectively.5
Figure 2. The concentration of population (%) in the SMA.
Sources: PCNBD (2004: 46); Korea Statistics Ofﬁce webpage.
Note: Concentration (%) = Metopolitan region population/Total population.
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While problems stemming from centralization persisted, the economic crisis and slowed
growth opened a great opportunity for a shift in intergovernmental relations through high-
lighting the problems of a central command-and-control system and the corruption
entrenched within it. Strong state intervention to boost the national economy initially suc-
ceeded in the 1970s–1980s, but this success also created issues such as mismanagement of
national ﬁnances, improper business–government relationships and a rigid labour market
(Haggard and Mo, 2000; Minns, 2001). The mismanagement of economic and monetary
policies and the non-transparent ﬁnancial assistance to government-favoured companies
and banks produced a moral hazard problem in Korea (Heo and Roehrig, 2010). As a
result of this outbreak of the worst economic crisis and several corruption scandals such
as bribery cases involving the president’s family, the approval rate for the Kim Young
Sam administration in 1997 fell below 10 percent and the general public swiftly lost conﬁ-
dence in the old centralized system. Under such circumstances, the most determined oppo-
sition ﬁgure, Kim Dae Jung, was elected to the presidency in December 1998.
Although recent developments in ideational theory highlight the role of ideas in more
or less incremental or transformative policy and institutional changes (Cartensen, 2011;
Schmidt, 2002), it is still plausible that ideas become very important in evaluating and cri-
ticizing existing institutions in times of crisis. Against this backdrop, the economic crises
opened up a new vista for competition among different ideas that could possibly reduce
the extreme uncertainty. Of course, the demand for decentralization has existed since
the founding of the nation, but the ‘political–economic’ conceptualization of it, with the
inﬂuence of globalization, neoliberalism and the demand for reinventing the government,
materialized more clearly in this period. The ﬁrst source of ideas on new central–local
relationships came from the globalization strategy based on neoliberalism. In order to
meet the so-called ‘global standards’, the Kim Young Sam administration (1993–1998),
by announcing the globalization strategy (segyehwa), attempted to cure the ‘Korean
Disease’ of inappropriate relationships and networks between big business and the govern-
ment by reducing the dominance of conglomerates and the power of central ministries
(Hahm and Kim, 1999).6 Yet it was criticized for containing more ‘rhetoric’ than incen-
tives for mobilization, although this globalization drive became the basis of speedy politi-
cal–economic reform in the subsequent administrations. Almost all sectors including big
business and central bureaucrats resisted this move toward globalization (Kihl, 2005: 138–
139). The difference was a contextual factor: the economic crisis.
Facing the unprecedented economic crisis, many opinion leaders, including western
commentators who called for rather drastic reform, started to focus on the inefﬁcient
central government institutions. Through the policy learning process, policy communities
and academics who were inspired by the political–economic ideas of decentralization
tackled the issues of the highly centralized decision-making system, ﬁnancial and popu-
lation concentration in the capital region. It was also recommended that serious conges-
tion in the capital region could be relieved by weakening central bureaucratic dominance.
In this delegitimizing process, different elements (ei) of a decentralization idea ranging
from a ‘small but strong’ federal system (economic scale-oriented, bigger provinces) to
European-style village-based autonomy (self-governing-oriented, democracy) have been
suggested, but the accepted element of decentralization was maintaining the current
two-tier structure of local governments and pursuing both devolution of central affairs
and ﬁnance and balanced regional development.7
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It was the Kim Dae-Jung administration that pushed forward liberalization of the old
political structure and the economy in the middle of the unprecedented external shock in
1997. President Kim effectively exploited ‘external pressure’—i.e. IMF bailout—to
implement neoliberal reform programmes without serious challenges from central stake-
holders and opposition groups (Ha, 2006: 14) and rather easily mobilized political support
from the general public and policy expert groups in the light of the economic crisis. Decen-
tralization was one of the 10 major reform agendas that included devolution, deconcen-
tration and privatization of public enterprises and deregulation. The next leader, Roh
Moo-Hyun also followed the strategy of the ‘bloc economy’ and emphasized the hub
status of Korea in the East Asian region that might be achieved through decentralization
and balanced regional development.8 He proactively took the lead in structural reform by
initiating innovative policies such as the creation of an administrative capital city in
Yeonggi-Gongju region (11 August 2004) and a balanced national development plan
(PCNBD, 2004). These policies were expressions of the strong political will of the presi-
dent, who believed that centralized administration and businesses were creating unnecess-
ary inefﬁciency and inequality in an age of economic difﬁculty by using rhetoric such as
‘efﬁcient government and democratic consolidation’ and ‘the age of locality’. As such, the
two presidents aimed to frame the discursive background for decentralization by high-
lighting the problems of the centralized system so as to enhance the national economy,
beyond a simple ‘Tocquevillian’ type of local democracy and decentralized state
(Rozman, 2002). In his inaugural address, President Roh said:
It is very important for Korea to decide whether to be a central country of Northeast Asia or
stay as a secondary country of the region… [… ] [M]any countries considered decentraliza-
tion strategy as a crucial national priority in the age of global competition and they are imple-
menting a localization strategy to transform their system to respond to global changes. In
Korea, decentralization is very delayed.9
In sum, the idea of decentralization was a part of the diagnosis of the economic difﬁculties
and political turmoil caused by the economic crisis and softened the political gridlock at the
centre. It is true that the two presidents were ideologically pro-decentralization compared to
the conservative one, but the ruling party was in a miniority. In this political landscape, it
was necessary for top political leaders to justify or legitimize the reform programmes to
the general public or opposition parties through various rhetorical symbols, such as the
decentralization idea, when they were planning controversial or innovative programmes
(Bleich, 2002; Schmidt, 2001). The reason why previous reform efforts were not successful
was simple: the centralized developmental state worked well and the earlier introduction of
local elections had limited impact on the top-down style of central–local government
relations. Yet the dysfunctional politics and economy at the centre opened a ‘policy
window’ and pushed top decision makers to call for a decentralization reform.
The politics of decentralization in the 2000s: idea and practical authority
Previous studies on the politics of decentralization in Korea often concluded that the
limited nature of decentralization under the authoritarian regime was the outcome of
strong resistance and interest politics of the central politicians and bureaucrats (Lee,
1996). Even when the crisis brought to the fore the problems of a centralized system,
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central politicians and bureaucrats still had a strong tendency to avoid any course of
action. Compared to the past reforms, however, the decentralization drive under the
Roh administration was somewhat successful and proceeded smoothly in terms of del-
egation and redistribution of authority. The SLDP bill passed in 2003 contained several
important steps toward decentralization that had previously failed to be enacted under
the authoritarian regime. In this regard, a number of historical institutionalists (e.g.
Hall, 1989; Weir, 1989) emphasized that reform ideas promoted by key advocating
actors and agencies would not be implemented due to the constitution and structure of
politics (veto points) or the legacy of existing policies. Turbulent political–economic cir-
cumstances often empower reformist politicians. In the 1990s–2000s Korea’s economic
downturn, democratic consolidation and changing circumstances provided a political
opportunity for reformist leaders (idea brokers) in government, who were often from
intellectual and scholarly groups, campaign managers or business consultants.
Political leadership and placement of ‘idea brokers’ in government
In the analysis of reform politics, ‘political gridlocks’ including bureaucrats, business inter-
ests and politicians have often been seen in the literature as having a stronger inﬂuence
(Mo, 2001). However, it would be a mistake to ignore the importance of strong presiden-
tial leadership in bringing about the changes in central–local government relations in
Korea. Under the authoritarian regime, the opposition party leaders who became presi-
dents after democratization used decentralization as a political strategy to discredit the
central political power and the authoritarian regime. After democratization, it was the
top political leaders who were in favour of decentralization in an era of economic difﬁcul-
ties and political transition. These high-proﬁle politicians were often critical of the process
of application of the values and propagation of decentralization ideas (Béland, 2009; Car-
tensen, 2010). They provided general support for the promotion of decentralization and
intervened at critical junctures to keep the process moving forward by appointing decentr-
alists (idea bearers) in key positions and coordinating bureaucratic and interministerial
conﬂicts.
First, the presidents inﬂuenced the setting of the agenda for decentralization reforms by
appointing advocates of decentralization as idea brokers in key executive or advisory pos-
itions in the government. In fact, there were divisions among advocates of decentralization
over the appropriate size of local governments and the scale of authority transfer. While
some argued that European-style village-level autonomy was the way to go, others pre-
ferred two tiers of local government or 70 regional governments for further economic
development (Kim, 2008). Those who supported devolution and balanced development
as the two priorities for administrations were strategically appointed to important pos-
itions. Kim Dae-Jung established a standing advisory committee—the Presidential Advi-
sory Committee on Policy Planning (PACPP)—to design coherent national reform
policies, and recruited reform-minded scholars. Roh brought forward many of his
policy staff’s recommendations for resolution of disparities between the centre and the
periphery, and thus decentralization and balanced development became two priorities
for his administration. Many high-ranking positions were ﬁlled by people who shared
‘the same idea’ of decentralization, de-concentration, balanced development and other
reform ideologies. For example, Byung-Joon Kim, a well-known decentralist scholar
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and one of the most inﬂuential political ﬁgures in the Roh administration, was appointed
as the chairman of the PCGID; and he designed coherent decentralization policies. Roh
also promoted some decentralists into top executive positions, such as Minister of the
Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) that played the role of a
control tower. The former MOGAHA, Doo-Kwan Kim, had built a reputation as a suc-
cessful leader of a small county (gun) in Gyeongsang Province and was suddenly promoted
to the head of Government Administration and Home Affairs, which was quite peculiar.
Furthermore, the chairman of PCGID, Sung-Sig Yoon, and the chairman of the Presiden-
tial Committee on National Balanced Development (PCNBD), Kyeong-Ryung Seong,
were also recognized as ‘decentralists’ because of their publications in academic journals
and membership of professional societies.10 As such, in terms of time sequence, the
Roh government placed decentralization issues at the top of its reform agenda. The pol-
itical appointees occupying key positions played a crucial role in the decentralization
process by building a ‘decentralization coalition’. Presidential authority over personnel
became an important tool for the pursuit of the decentralization idea.11
More importantly, these appointments were possible because the two presidents were
‘decentralists’ themselves. The original pioneer of a speciﬁc idea is usually in a privileged
position when choosing the elements of ideas that should be accorded priority (Cartensen,
2010: 851). Kim Dae-Jung was the ‘original pioneer’ among opposition politicians who
had advocated the decentralization idea in the earlier period of authoritarianism. Roh,
even before he became a prominent political ﬁgure, was deeply inﬂuenced by the idea
of decentralization and established his own private research institute on local autonomy,
the Centre for Local Autonomy (Chibangjachi Silmuyo˘nguso), in 1993.12 Although the
PCGID and its decentralist staff were given powers to conduct investigations and deliber-
ate on basic matters related to decentralization, the power to achieve consensus among
central agencies was eventually vested in the president.13 While the president utilized a
variety of techniques to build his management capabilities, he used the policy staff in
the Presidential Ofﬁce as a bridge to the ministries and bureaucrats. In order to keep
the policy staff within the presidential orbit, the Presidential Ofﬁce hosted regular meet-
ings to discuss policy issues, reform policies, legislative strategies and coordination pro-
blems with other agencies, which frequently came up in these meetings. By having
contacts with the senior departmental staff—such as the vice-minister—on a regular
basis, the presidential policy advisors and staff tried to circulate and reinforce the presi-
dent’s values and the immediate policy goals. Although the political authority and prero-
gative of the presidency have become substantially weaker under the civilian governments,
the legacy of the ‘strong presidency’ in Korea still gives the president much power to inter-
vene in governmental processes at any critical juncture.14
Top political leaders interpreted the current situation as a window of opportunity for
decentralization reform. Roh empowered relevant agencies such as PCGID and
MOGAHA, which had been considered by past administrations as mere secondary or
advisory government organizations, by giving them critical roles in the whole process of
decentralization. There was still some room for interest-based politics and resistance
from sectoral politicians and central bureaucrats but decentralist politicians effectively
mobilized their ideational allies in governmental organizations.
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Ideas and practical authority: dealing with internal resistance
In decentralization politics in the past, as classical studies such as Niskanen (1971) on
bureaucratic behaviour have analysed, central bureaucrats and politicians have often
been the most important barriers to decentralization reforms in Korea’s modern
history. In fact, strategic use of ideas does not mean that idea brokers and advocates
can easily disregard the vested interests attached to existing institutions. Instead, they
have to work around those interests and institutions to ensure the new idea gets the top
priority (Cartensen, 2011). When SLDP in 2003 and the follow-up decentralization pro-
grammes were introduced, the Roh administration, supported by idea bearers, paid par-
ticular attention to this ‘internal resistance’ matter and was relatively successful in
dealing with central actors’ opposition. Since decentralization meant ministerial reorgan-
ization and loss of jobs, a number of groups were apprehensive.
First, as one of the core reform-related agencies under the Roh administration, the
MOGAHA was in charge of carrying out several important tasks for the completion of
decentralization.15 However, bureaucrats at the ministry responsible for implementing
decentralization-related tasks had to worry about their own jobs. For them, the Presiden-
tial Ofﬁce’s attention to reorganization of central affairs meant that functions of the
MOHAGA were expected to be abolished or demoted to small agencies if the decentrali-
zation project was to be fully implemented. Since most of local government-related affairs
were on the ‘to-be-devolved’ list, the job of the MOGAHAwas to delegate most of its func-
tions and human resources as well as its budget to subnational governments. In August
2003 a number of workers in the MOGAHA Employee Association decided to ﬂoat an
organization—A Team for Keeping MOGAHA (Haengjabu Jikimi Gihoekdan)—to sys-
tematically oppose the plan of delegation (Seoul Newspaper, 2003). Workers in other min-
istries also joined forces to support the resistance. Leaders of public workers unions kept in
contact with other ministries’ employee associations on a regular basis and cooperated
with them in opposing decentralization.
Beyond job security matters, there was also widespread scepticism about the capability
and moral rectitude of subnational governments among central bureaucrats. According to
a survey, about 60 percent of central bureaucrats raised questions about the level of com-
petence of local bureaucrats and thought they were superior to their local counterparts in
dealing with government affairs (KIPA, 2002: 27). In particular, bureaucrats in the Min-
istry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and Ministry of Planning and Budget (MOPB)
were very sensitive to issues such as raising the local allocation tax rate from 15 percent
to 18.3 percent (currently 19.24 percent) and creation of local income tax (Kim et al.,
2004: 47). As these examples indicate, it was clear that central bureaucrats were up
against the decentralization reform and tried to thwart the possibility of decentralization
of their jobs and affairs (Dong-A Ilbo, 2004b).
Second, with occasional exceptions, national politicians and assemblymen were gener-
ally less cooperative due to the potential conﬂict of interests. Before the revision of the
Local Autonomy Act (1994), national assemblymen had served as the main policy chan-
nels to deliver local requests and concerns to the central political world through their case-
work, pork-barrelling and lawmaking. Moreover, they had carried considerable clout over
local personnel and budget implementation, because they used to be the only ‘elected’ ofﬁ-
cials who could directly access the central policy-making process (Ahn, 2001). However,
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since the full-ﬂedged local elections in 1995, the status of assemblymen as ‘imperial poli-
ticians’ at the subnational level had changed, because of the rise of elected governors and
mayors. Since then, the relationships between local executives and national assemblymen
has become more contentious over many local issues. Therefore in the process of SLDP in
December of 2003, few assemblymen were supportive, and a number of politicians went so
far as to propose abolishing local elections for basic-level local government leaders (si, gun,
gu), and to limit the tenures of local mayors and councilmen to three consecutive terms.
They claimed that these measures would prevent corruption and complacency among
local politicians.16
As such, the vested interests of central bureaucrats and politicians could have jeopar-
dized delegation of central affairs and empowerment of local governments. Yet President
Roh and decentralist ministers—e.g. Doo-Kwan Kim and Sung-Kwan Heo—played
crucial roles in managing the bureaucrats’ complaints and resistance and enabling the
MOGAHA and other ministries to carry out decentralization. First, while President
Roh provided the MOGAHA with new functions such as e-government, immigration
policy and government innovation in place of the ministry’s affairs that had been trans-
ferred to local governments,17 he empowered the ministry to prepare the government
bills for decentralization, deal with other ministries’ complaints and develop detailed pro-
grammes for actual implementation (MOGAHA, 2005). After experiencing the ﬁrst
massive layoffs during the period of IMF bailout, central bureaucrats fully realized that
their jobs were no longer the ‘iron rice bowl’ (lifetime job) and they could not help but
accept a certain level of reorganization.18 While the ruling party and the national assem-
blymen were still less autonomous when the presidency was strong (see C. Park, 2008), few
politicians publicly raised objections to the passage of the SLPD, because they did not want
to be labelled as anti-decentralists or ‘old-fashioned’ conservatives.
In addition, many special committees (wiwonhoe) under the Ofﬁce of the President or
the Ofﬁce of the Prime Minister have become crucial in disseminating the decentralization
idea. Among the various presidential advisory committees, the PCGID was the key organ-
ization supporting the politics of decentralization and government innovation. Because
the original legal nature and the mission was simply to provide ‘advice’ to the president
on issues of government reform (SLDP Article 17), the committee initially was recognized
as an advisory committee and yet it began to engage in practical experimentation on a
smaller scale and later this action gradually produced intermediate outcomes such as
the Decentralization Roadmap (2003). In fact the PCGID exercised practical authority
in coordinating the different opinions of central ministries with regard to the process of
decentralization because President Roh fully supported and encouraged this committee
by strategically placing the decentralists. The PCGID contributed to networking with
various interest groups on the issue of decentralization and developed a diverse set of
decentralization strategies via several academic conferences and workshops such as the
Regional Forum on Reinventing Government in Asia (September 2006). The chairman
frequently gave special lectures or presentations to civil servants. The committee held
rounds of discussions across the country in which various interest groups participated.
Also, through the publication of reports and hosting of conferences, the committee
gave examples of successful cases of government innovation and disseminated the beneﬁts
of decentralization to citizens. Moreover, in terms of legislative politics, the PCGID
attempted to elicit cooperation from central political actors—in particular opposition
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parties—by sending ofﬁcers to address explanatory seminars and meetings attended by the
assemblymen and members of the Subcommittee on Administrative Autonomy and the
Subcommittee on Legislation and Judiciary, which were responsible for the passage of
the law in the National Assembly (December 2003).19 At the same time, the highly motiv-
ated committee members attempted to negotiate with other central ministries and civic
organizations by arguing that it would be difﬁcult for the decentralization bill to be
passed in the National Assembly if it covered sensitive issues that caused conﬂicts
among stakeholders (Kim et al., 2004). In this way, the PCGID was able to build trust
and gradually gained ‘external’ recognition as a core reform agency. By building capabili-
ties and reputation beyond simply being a consultative committee, reform-minded
specialists in the committee could exercise practical authority and contribute to develop-
ing the blueprints for decentralization and innovation. Given the context of economic
shock, distrust in government, regional disparity and a globalizing economy, the commit-
tees and their key decentralists as idea brokers employed various types of negotiation and
persuasion tactics to pressure central bureaucrats and politicians who were reluctant to
acquiesce to the reform.
In this context, the central actors could not publicly take a stand against the wave of
decentralization. The internal conﬂict and resistance were not easily captured by mass
media or scholarly works because Korean bureaucrats valued ‘unity’ in their organizations.
In the case of decentralization, it was the ‘decentralization idea’ promoted by reformists
that effectively softened their resistance. Some conﬂicting issues such as ﬁscal transfers
were treated ‘ambiguouly’ to reduce denunciations without any practical policy impli-
cations. Yet, considering the past reform failures, it was the empowered decentralists
with practical authority who eventually overcame resistance from central stakeholders
through repeated persuasion.
Civil society and public sentiments: socialization of the idea
Studies on local politics and decentralization consistently demonstrate the importance of
mobilization of local and civil society in the activities for the promotion of democracy
(Grindle, 2007). Although local stakeholders, including local politicians, civic organiz-
ations and general citizens, were not direct participants in the process of lawmaking,
the rise of decentralization movements from local governments, civic communities and
scholarly groups are viewed as one of the most signiﬁcant trends in the central–local gov-
ernments’ relations in contemporary Korean politics (B. Park, 2008). In fact, the attitudes
on decentralization shared by subnational stakeholders, labelled as ‘public sentiment’
(Campbell, 2004: 159–160), inﬂuenced the relative success of decentralization in many
cases (Eaton, 2001) and there has been a collective belief among the public and academics
about the necessity of decentralization, particularly for better public services and fast econ-
omic recovery.
A decade of developmental authoritarianism deterred local politicians and citizens
from promoting local democracy and governing their communities, but even the
limited range of local elections since the mid-1990s have changed the local political land-
scape. In particular, as Bae and Kim (2013) argued, professionalization, diversiﬁcation and
institutionalization of civil society at both national and local levels were indispensable in
pushing forward decentralization. Since the 2002 presidential elections, local civic groups,
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such as the Civic Movement for Decentralization (CMD, established in 2000), have
initiated decentralization movements in the major metropolitan cities. Many of ‘pro-
decentralization’ local intellectuals such as local journalists, university professors,
leaders of civic organizations and businessmen have participated in this organization
and attempted to address issues of local disparity, inequality, underdevelopment and so
forth on various occasions.20 Beyond simple lobbying activities, some activists such as
Hyung-Ki Kim, the founder of the CMD, directly participated in government meetings
hosted by PCGID as representatives of civic organizations or external consultants and pro-
posed various policy alternatives.21 In addition, prominent civic organizations at national
level, such as the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Citizens’
Coalition for Economic Justics (CCEJ), also established separate divisions or teams to
deal with decentralization issues and actively participated in the national discourse on
decentralization.
Moreover, as Korean localities were rapidly urbanized and local democratic politics was
consolidated after the mid-1990s, local governments were expected to play a bigger role,
with the maximum effort to make futher decentralization happen. First, local govern-
ments, through their representative organizations such as National Association of Gover-
nors, National Association of Mayors, called for a holistic approach to the division of
powers within the nation. This strategy entailed an integrated approach to decentralization
so that major decisions on political, administrative and ﬁscal decentralization could be
adopted as a single package.22 The four organizations (governors, mayors, provincial
and city councillors) also organized an executive committee for negotiation with the
central government and prepared their alternative bills for the promotion of decentraliza-
tion by cooperating with civic organizations. Second, political discourses from powerful
local politicians became very inﬂuential in the process of decentralization. As local elec-
toral politics grew to be politically critical, candidates running as mayors and governors
of big cities were nominated from the pool of powerful ﬁgures in national politics.
Based on this empowered status, some nationally recognized local politicians issued
press statements regarding the central government’s decentralization policy.
Despite the inherently restricted system of local autonomy, there was unprecedented
support for local democracy and decentralization from below. The local decentralization
movement, which had developed from the growth of local governance and local society
since the late 1990s, motivated local intellectuals to pursue decentralization more actively
and helped local citizens understand the value of democracy at least on a superﬁcial level.
This kind of local activism challenged the central dominance and was possible due to
widespread understanding of the value and beneﬁt of decentralization.
An analysis
The politics of decentralization in Korea could have been explained by typical power poli-
tics, inter-scalar tension or democratization theories. More people certainly participated in
deliberations over the new central–local government relations and deepening of local
democracy. That said, how could Korea enact decentralization promotion laws in the
2000s, despite the lack of historical experience and prevalence of the central interests? I
argue that the analytical framework, which builds on the mechanism of idea diffusion—
i.e. leadership, idea brokers and public sentiment—captures the broader picture of
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decentralization politics in Korea over a considerable empirical range.While political
transformation and economic crisis in the late 1990s had considerable delegitimizing
effects on the centralized system, top leaders diaognosed Korea’s political and economic
problems as a crisis and conceived of decentralization as the solution, thereby putting
decentralization at the top of national agenda. This idea shaped the overall and speciﬁc
discursive background of decentralization reform, but at the same time the implemen-
tation process was further complicated by exisiting poiltical institutions, stakeholders
and the political process. Considering the failure of previous decentralization reform,
the political process analyzed in the previous section suggests that traditional stakeholders
at the centre—central bureaucrats and sectoral politicians—in decentralization politics
had limited options to choose from within the dominant idea of decentralization. Thus,
they viewed compliance as an unpleasant necessity and negotiated with reformers
behind the scences.
Another important ﬁnding is the formation of practical authority in the process of idea-
based reform politics. An accepted idea is not usually disseminated as a uniﬁed package
but rather continuously constructed and reconstructed through small-scale practices
(Sikkink, 1991; Abers and Keck, 2013). In Korea, decentralists (idea brokers) in govern-
ment organizations and committees made great efforts to overcome obdurate resistance
over decentralization plans, and to ﬁnd available resources and networks they could
utilize to build new central–local government relationships. In doing so, they gradually
built an internal and external reputation to exercise practical authority. Decision
making and implementation are situated within the broader discourse in the period of pol-
itical and economic turmoil and make possible signiﬁcant change, which had not been
possible in the past.
The idea-based theory possibly explains why subsequent governments—i.e. the Lee
Myeong Bak administration (2008–2013) and the Park Geun Hye administration
(2013–present)—have been less interested in or have slowed the follow-up decentraliza-
tion reform.23 On the surface, it seems that the Lee administration continued to transfer
central affairs and established a decentralization promotion committee (2008). Yet the
removal of ‘home affairs’ from the competent central ministry’s domain (from the Min-
istry of ‘Government Administration and Home Affairs’ to the Ministry of ‘Public Admin-
istration and Safety’) and President Lee’s plan for a mega-regional economic zone
(reorganization of local governments) were rather regarded as strengthening central auth-
ority. This indicates that demise of the idea’s mechanism—pro-decentralization leader,
idea brokers and public support—can weaken the pursuit and continuity of the reform.
Conclusion
The principal theme of this paper is its insistence that we must consider the ﬂow of ideas
within the broader context of domestic and global political–economic arrangements if we
are to understand why nations pursue certain types of decentralization policies and why
those policies change. Conventional explanations on the causes of the varieties of decen-
tralization across countries mainly focus on the modernization factors, party and electoral
politics, or other elements. By rejecting overly individual or structural accounts, this idea-
tional approach intends to offer an additional explanation of decentralization that stresses
the way in which an ‘idea’ structures the central–local government relationship and the
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direction of regional policy. It has important implications for conventional political analy-
sis and it shows how ideas frame political discourses and how they can restrict or shape the
politics of interests among political actors. The formation of practical authority for key
reformers and agencies in the process of decentralization were also important.
It might be difﬁcult to tease out the pure effect of ideas for understanding institutional
change. Still, the idea-based framework offered in this research attempts to show the limit-
ations of interest-based explanations for institutional change by paying attention to the
ideological background of decision makers and actors who were responsible for decentra-
lization reform. It was the decentralization idea that pushed various stakeholders to
rethink their relative positions under the rapidly changing global economy and domestic
political realignment. Struggles among political actors calculating the costs and beneﬁts of
the status quo in the context of great uncertainty were constrained or displaced by the
dominant idea. Without understanding the role of the idea, it would be difﬁcult to
explain why central political stakeholders agreed to share their political and ﬁnancial
power with their local counterparts in the context of economically hard times.
Beyond the argument that ‘ideas matter’, future research about ideas and institutional
change should further explore the nature of relationships among different elements of an
idea and how their emphasis changes incrementally, while the core is sustained. The case
of Korean decentralization illustrated that slightly different elements of the decentraliza-
tion idea—village-level autonomy, small federal states, economic zones, etc.—were
favoured and emphasized by the Kim Dae-Jung, Roh Moo-Hyun and Lee Myung Bak
administrations. This incremental change within the broader discursive background of
decentralization (idea) possibly depends on each regime’s knowledge of the ideational
element’s ‘alluring’ qualities, but it still remained as a black box. In addition, we are still
in need of rigorous empirical analyses on the question of ‘how much weight’ should be
assigned to ideational factors in explaining institutional or policy changes.
Notes
1. Under the divided government of 1988 for the ﬁrst time in Korean history, President Roh Tae
Woo exercised his veto on the revised Local Autonomy Act (1989) and delayed the full-ﬂedged
elections of local governments (Lee, 1996: 6).
2. Interview with a senior bureaucrat at MOGAHA on 12 October 2005.
3. Since the mainstream ideational studies primarily emphasize the importance of ideas in times
of structural crises, recent theoretical development has paid attention to ideational analysis of
incremental and transformative changes (Cartensen, 2011).
4. For example, as a key politician and democratic activist from the opposition party, the former
President Kim Dae Jung’s discourse mainly emphasized democratic beneﬁts, but after he
returned to politics from his hiatus in 1995, he put greater emphasis upon the idea of ‘equality’
among different regions (Lee, 2011, http://www.pressian.com/news/article_print.html?no=
3797).
5. These kinds of programmes initiated in the early 1970s included the removal of some govern-
mental agencies and manufacturers to newly developed regions and restrictions on new indus-
tries in the capital city area (OECD, 2001: 96–97).
6. For example, the Kim administration enacted reform measures such as an anti-corruption law,
a real-name banking system, and a fair competition law (Lee, 2000: 104–112). Many powerful
ministries were merged or displaced and there were many layoffs among central bureaucrats on
3 December 1994 (Kim, 1999: 169).
7. Interview with former member of PCGID on 25 February 2015.
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8. This goal, combining national competitiveness and liberalization policies including decentra-
lization, was outlined in several presidential addresses (PCNBD, 2004: 28–29).
9. Roh Moo-Hyun’s address at the Forum on Five-Year Innovative Development of Incheon
Region, on 8 July 2004 (quoted from PCNBD, 2004: 28–29).
10. Roh personally confessed that his reform idea was inﬂuenced by a scholarly book, the Vision
and Strategy of Government Innovation. The author, Sung-sig Yoon, was appointed chairman
of PCGID in 2003 (Dong-A Ilbo, 2004a).
11. Interview with a civic activist at the Civic Movement for Decentralization on 10 October 2005.
12. The purpose of this centre was educating local ofﬁcials and elite groups about the value of local
democracy and autonomy (Interview with the former policy advisor to the President Roh on 23
July 2009).
13. Ibid.
14. For example, when three central ministries’ turf war over local allocation tax reform reached its
peak, President Roh himself settled the conﬂicts directly. Interview with the former chairman
of PCGID on 19 October 2005.
15. The Kim Dae-Jung administration created the MOGAHA in 1998 (28 February) and the min-
istry had managed local affairs mainly through two subdivisions, the Division of Local Admin-
istration and the Division of Local Finance and Taxation.
16. Forty-two assemblymen actually proposed the revision of the Local Autonomy Act (1994) to
abolish the basic-level local elections in 2000 (29 November), though the proposal was defeated
(Ahn, 2001).
17. Interview with the former leader of the Employee Association at MOGAHA on 18 October
2005.
18. Interview with a senior bureaucrat at MOGAHA on 12 October 2005.
19. Ibid.
20. One of the notable facts about CMD is, unlike other types of civil society movements, it was
organized exclusively by local actors who took up the promotion of decentralization and
self-governance by organizing a mass meeting called ‘National Intellectuals’ Declaration for
Decentralization’ in September 2001 or announcing a local charter in March of 2001
(B. Park, 2008).
21. Interview with a civic activist at the Citizen’s Coalition for Better Government on 28 October
2005.
22. Local government associations refused the central government’s incremental strategy, because
this approach resulted in slowed or unbalanced decentralization in the previous administrations.
Interview with a senior specialist at National Association of Mayors on 21 October 2005.
23. Some argue that decentralization under the Lee administration can be seen as less progressive
because major devolutions were already implemented under the previous administration
(Interview with a former minister on 23 February 2015). Yet many indicators such as appoint-
ment of non-decentralists, decreasing ﬁscal independent ratio and a worsening local economy
reafﬁrm that the administration was less interested in decentralization (Interview with a
bureaucrat at a provincial government on 15 February 2015).
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Jefferey Sellers, Ann Florini, John Donaldson, Apichai Shipper, and
Toshiya Kitayama for invaluable comments and suggestions on the earlier versions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the author.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 83
Funding
This research was funded by the Singapore Ministry of Education [grant number 08-C242-SMU-
025] and Academy of Korean Studies [grant number AKS-2014-R43].
Notes on contributor
Yooil Bae is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Singapore Management University. His
research focuses on state–society relations, urban and regional political economy, and public
policy in East Asia.
References
Abers, R. and Keck, M. (2013). Practical Authority: Agency and Institutional Change in Brazilian
Water Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ahn, K.-S. (2001). ‘Inside story of the proposal for the appointment of headman of basic-level local
governments’, Sin Dong-A, January. Available at: http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine/new_
donga/200101/nd2001010150.html
Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Bae, Y. and Kim, S. (2013). ‘Civil society and local activism in South Korea’s local democratization’,
Democratization, 20(2): 260–286.
Béland, D. (2009). ‘Ideas, institutions, and policy change’, Journal of European Public Policy, 16(5):
701–718.
Berman, S. (2001). ‘Review: ideas, norms, and culture in political analysis’, Comparative Politics, 33
(2): 235–250.
Bleich, E. (2002). ‘Integrating ideas into policy-making analysis: frames and race policies in Britain
and France’, Comparative Political Studies, 35(9): 1054–1076.
Blyth, M. (2002). Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth
Century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, J. (2004). Institutional Change and Globalization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Cartensen, M. B. (2010). ‘The nature of ideas, and why political scientists should care: analysing the
Danish jobcentre reform from an ideational perspective’, Political Studies, 58(5): 847–863.
Cartensen, M. B. (2011). ‘Ideas are not as stable as political scientists want them to be: a theory of
incremental ideational change’, Political Studies, 59(3): 596–615.
Checkel, J. (1997). Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behaviour and the End
of the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Cheema, G and Rondinelli, D. (2007). ‘From government decentralization to decentralized govern-
ance’ in G. Cheema and D. Rondinelli (eds), Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and
Practice. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 1–20.
Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press.
DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1991). ‘Introduction’ in W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds), The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1–40.
Dong-A Ilbo (2004a). ‘Roh, recommended to read Professor Yoon’s book’, 19 September.
Dong-A Ilbo (2004b). ‘The current status of decentralization’, 15 December. Available at: http://
news.donga.com/3/all/20041214/8138965/1
Eaton, K. (2001). ‘Political obstacles to decentralization: evidence from Argentina and the
Philippines’, Development and Change, 32(1): 101–127.
Faguet, J. (2014). ‘Decentralization and governance’, World Development, 53(1): 2–13.
Falleti, T. (2010). Decentralization and Subnational Politics in Latin America. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
84 Y. BAE
Florini, A. N. (1996). ‘The evolution of international norms’, International Studies Quarterly, 40(3):
363–389.
Garman, C., Haggard, S. and Willis, E. (2001). ‘Fiscal decentralisation: a political theory with Latin
American cases’, World Politics, 53(2): 205–236.
Grindle, M. (2007). Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good
Governance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ha, Y. (2006). ‘Policy idea and institutional change’, Korean Journal of Public Administration, 44(4):
1–27.
Haggard, S. and Mo, J. (2000). ‘The political economy of the Korean ﬁnancial crisis’, Review of
International Political Economy, 7(2): 197–218.
Hahm, S. and Kim K. (1999). ‘Institutional reforms and democratization in Korea: the case of the
Kim Young Sam administration’, Governance, 12(4): 479–494.
Hall, P. (1989). ‘Conclusion: The politics of Keynesian ideas’ in P. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of
Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
pp. 361–392.
Heo, U. and Roehrig, T. (2010). South Korea since 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jun, J. and Wright, D. (1996). Globalization and Decentralization: Institutional Contexts, Policy
Issues, and Intergovernmental Relations in Japan and the United States. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press.
Kamarck, E. (2000). ‘Globalization and public administration reform’ in J. Nye and J. Dohahue
(eds), Governance in a Globalizing World. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution,
pp. 229–252.
Kihl, Y. (2005). Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture. New York:
M. E. Sharpe.
Kim, I. (2008). ‘The crisis structure of Korean local autonomy and future plan’, Korean Public
Administration Review, 42(2): 5–30 (in Korean).
Kim, P. (1999). ‘Administrative reform in the Korean central government: a case study of the Dae
Jung Kim administration’, Public Performance and Management Review, 24(2): 145–160.
Kim, R., Koo, J. and Yoo, K. (2004). ‘A network analysis of local decentralisation policy in Korea’,
Journal of Dae-Han Political Science Association, 12(1): 27–53 (in Korean).
Kingdon, J. W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. New York: HarperCollins.
Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) (2002). 2002 Survey Research on the
Intergovernmental Relationship (IGR) Based on the Perceptions of Central and Local Public
Ofﬁcials in Korea. Seoul: KIPA (in Korean).
Kwon, K. (2004). ‘Regionalism in South Korea: its origins and role in her democratization’, Politics
and Society, 32(4): 545–574.
Lee, J. (1996). ‘The politics of decentralisation in Korea’, Local Government Studies, 22(3): 60–71.
Lee, S.-H. (2011). ‘Hunger strike for thirteen days, opened the age of local autonomy’, Pressian, 23
March. Available at: http://www.pressian.com/news/article_print.html?no=3797 [Accessed 3
July 2015].
Lee, Y. (2000). ‘The rise and fall of Kim Young Sam’s embedded reformism’ in L. Diamond and D.
Shin (eds), Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institute, pp. 97–126.
Marks, G., Hooghe, L. and Schakel, A. (2008). ‘Measuring regional authority’, Regional and Federal
Studies, 18(2–3): 111–121.
Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) (2002). 2002 Annual Report on National
Land Use. Seoul: MOCT (in Korean).
Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) (2005). The Current
Status of Five-Year Comprehensive Plan for Decentralisation. Seoul: MOGAHA (in Korean).
Minns, J. (2001). ‘Of miracles and models: the rise and decline of the developmental state in South
Korea’, Third World Quarterly, 22(6): 1025–1043.
Mo, J. (2001). ‘Political culture and legislative gridlock politics of economic reform in precrisis
Korea’, Comparative Political Studies, 34(5): 467–492.
Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and Representation. Aldine: Atherton.
ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 85
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2001). OECD Territorial
Reviews: Korea. Paris: OECD.
Park, B. (2008). ‘Uneven development, interscalar tensions, and the politics of decentralization in
South Korea’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(1): 40–59.
Park, C. W. (2008). ‘The National Assembly in the consolidation process of Korean democracy’,
Asian Journal of Political Science, 5(2): 96–113.
Presidential Committee on National Balanced Development (PCNBD) (2004). The Vision and
Strategy of National Balanced Development. Seoul: PCNBD (in Korean).
Riedl, R. and Dickovick, T. (2013). ‘Party systems and decentralisation in Africa’, Studies in
Comparative International Development, 49(3): 321–342.
Roddan, J. (2004). ‘Comparative federalism and decentralisation: on meaning and measurement’,
Comparative Politics, 36(4): 481–500.
Rodriguez-Pose, A. and Ezcurra, R. (2010). ‘Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A
cross-country analysis’, Journal of Economic Geography, 10(5): 619–644.
Rondinelli, D., Johnson J. and Kasarda D. (1998). ‘The changing forces of urban economic devel-
opment: globalization and city competitiveness’, Cityscape: The Journal of Policy Development
and Research, 3(3): 71–105.
Rozman, G. (2002). ‘Decentralization in East Asia: a reassessment of its background and potential’,
Development and Society, 32(1): 1–22.
Schmidt, V. (2001). ‘The politics of economic adjustment in France and Britain: when does dis-
course matter?’, Journal of European Public Policy, 8(2): 247–264.
Schmidt, V. (2002). ‘Does discourse matter in the politics of welfare state adjustment?’,
Comparative Political Studies, 35(2): 168–193.
Seoul Newspaper (2003). ‘The diminution of authority, a sense of crisis spreading within the
MOGAHA’, 3 August. Available at: http://www.seoul.co.kr//news/newsView.php?code=&id=
20030804006004&keyword=%BC%D2%B9%E6%B9%E6%C0%E7%C3%BB
Sharpe, L. (1988). ‘The growth and the decentralisation of the modern democratic state’, European
Journal of Political Research, 16(4): 365–380.
Sikkink, K. (1991). Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Argentina and Brazil. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Sonn, J. (2010). ‘Contesting state rescaling: an analysis of the South Korean state’s discursive strat-
egy against devolution’, Antipode, 42(5): 1200–1224.
Treisman, D. (2007). The Architecture of Government. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Turner, M. (1999). ‘Central–local relations: themes and issues’ in M. Turner (ed.), Central–Local
Relations in Asia-Paciﬁc: Convergence or Divergence? New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 1–19.
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) (2009).Decentralization and Local Democracy in the
World. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Wade, R. (1990). Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian
Industrialisation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wade, L. and Kim, B. (1978). Economic Development of South Korea: The Political Economy of
Success. New York: Praeger.
Walsh, J. (2000). ‘When do ideas matter? Explaining the success and failure of Thatcherite ideas’,
Comparative Political Studies, 33(4): 483–516.
Weir, M. (1989). ‘Ideas and politics: the acceptance of Keynesianism in Britain and the United
States’ in P. Hall (ed.), The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 53–87.
Yee, A. (1996). ‘The causal effects of ideas on policies’, International Organization, 50(1): 69–108.
Yoo, J. (1994). ‘The politics of local autonomy: the role of political parties’, Korean Public
Administration Review, 28(2): 499–523 (in Korean).
Yoo, J. (2006). ‘The politics of local government reform: South Korea and the United States’ in C.
Park (ed.), The Crisis of Korean Local Democracy: Challenges and Tasks. Seoul: Nanam
Publishing, pp. 85–116 (in Korean).
86 Y. BAE
